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Abstract
QR code is an important means for delivering information which has been widely used in our
daily life. As an ISO international standard, the QR code encoding and decoding process are
disclosed publicly, thus it is easy to decode a QR code then forge a new QR code with the
same QR code public message. It can lead to the problems of information forgery and ease the
spreading of fake news. To overcome this weakness, we propose a simple and efficient QR
code authentication mechanism to embed the authentication information in the padding region
of QR code based on the characteristics of Sudoku and Reed-Solomon code. Different from
the previous scheme, the proposed scheme embeds the authentication information without
consuming the QR code error correction capacity and is able to achieve a higher embedding
capacity. Experimental results show that the proposed scheme has high security, low power
consumption and is robust to common QR code attacks.
Keywords QR code . Authentication . Sudoku . Reed-Solomon code
1 Introduction
With the strength of high information capacity and ease of use, QR code has been widely used
in a variety of scenarios, such as information delivering [17, 18], product information tracking
[20], mobile payment [15], product marketing [3] and e-ticketing [4]. However, as an ISO
international standard, the QR code encoding process and decoding process is opened as
public property, thus it is easy to decode a QR code then forge a new QR code with the same
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QR code public message. It will open the possibilities for the malicious users to deliver fake
news or messages. With the popularity of QR code in our daily life, the possibility of a QR
code being attacked is increasing [11, 16]. Authentication technology can be used to enhance
the security of QR code by embedding authentication code in the QR code. Taking the QR
code invoice as an example, Fig. 1 shows a QR code invoice from 7-Eleven mart. Shopping
information such as commodity items is encoded as the public message of QR codes in the
invoice. Thus, such a QR code is difficult to prevent the return fraud. Therefore, it will be
beneficial to the general public if we can embed a new feature to the QR code to enable anti-
forgery to prevent the invoice forgers. One of the effective solutions is to embed authentication
code in the QR code of this invoice. If necessary, the authenticity of the invoice can be easily
verified by checking the authentication code which is hidden in the QR code.
In recent years, many scholars have studied the QR code authentication mechanisms. Their
schemes could be divided into two categories. One is to use the digital watermark technology
to authenticate QR code. Sun et al. [23] proposed two kinds of algorithms to embed a random
serial number or an image in the high frequency spectrum of QR code image to prevent piracy
Fig. 1 A QR code invoice from 7-Eleven mart
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based on discrete wavelet transform. Li et al. [12] proposed a QR code watermarking scheme
to embed an invisible watermark into the QR code image based on the discrete cosine
transform. Combining with chaos encryption algorithm and singular value decomposition,
Qin et al. [21] designed an anti-fake digital watermarking algorithm for QR code by doing
three layers wavelet decomposition to the QR code image. When there is a concern on the
authenticity of the QR code, the corresponding watermark extraction process of these schemes
would be easily performed, and the authenticity of QR code would be verified by checking the
extracted watermarks. Obviously, the correct extraction of watermark is the key to their
schemes. To improve the reliability of these watermarking algorithms, their schemes always
needed high-precision equipment to ensure that the watermark in the QR code could be
extracted correctly.
The other category is to employ the data hiding technology [9, 14] to authenticate the QR
code. Tkachenko et al. [24] presented a kind of two-level QR code. Compared to the standard
QR code, this rich QR code has a private level storage to embed the authentication code in the
black modules of the QR code by directly replacing with special textural patterns. Obviously,
the design and recognition of those suitable textural patterns always are the critical issues of
their scheme. The practicality of their scheme is poor.
To prove the practicality of QR code authentication scheme, Chen [2] proposed another QR
code authentication scheme by embedding authentication code in the padding region of QR
code. For the public message, Chen’s scheme firstly employed Reed-Solomon algorithm to
generate the RS code for QR code and fitted them into a QR code. Secondly, he determined the
embedding locations in the QR code and generated the authentication code from the public
message by exploiting cryptographic algorithm, such as the Universal Message Authentication
Code (UMAC) [1] or the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) [13]. In order
to improve the success rate of authentication code extraction, he yielded the redundant
information for authentication code. Finally, he embedded the authentication code in the front
portion of error correction codewords of QR code by directly replacing with authentication
code. After masking operation, the stego QR code would be generated. Thanks to the QR code
redundancy, the public message of stego QR code could be successfully decoded by any
standard QR code reader. If necessary, the authentication code could be extracted with the
correct encrypted key. Moreover, the verification process could be performed off-line by
authorized users when needed. Experimental results showed that Chen’s scheme has a good
embedding capacity and achieves a high security level.
However, Chen’s scheme has some flaws. The first one is the robustness of the generated
stego QR code is poor. His scheme directly replaced portions of the error correction codewords
of QR code with authentication code to embed authentication code. The replacement operation
would cause a lot of mistakes in the Reed-Solomon code of QR code. In order to decode the
QR code, redundant error correction codewords were needed to correct these mistakes. It leads
to a decrease in error correction capacity of stego QR code. Thus the stego QR code decoding
process might fail when stego QR code was suffered additional attacks, such as defacement or
damage. The second weakness is the redundant information for the authentication code not
only reduces the embedding capacity of stego QR code, but also reduces the error correction
capacity of stego QR code. The last weakness is the cryptograph algorithm for generating and
verifying the authentication code still requires heavy computational power. For a battery-
powered scanner, such complex algorithm is not preferred.
In this paper, we propose a new QR code authentication scheme to improve these
weaknesses. To summarize, this paper has primarily made the following contributions:
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1) Higher embedding capacity. The proposed scheme embeds the authentication code in
the padding region of QR code, so the upper bound of the embedded capacity depends on
the length of the QR code padding region. Experimental results show that the proposed
scheme has higher embedding capacity compared to the state-of-the-art scheme.
2) Stronger robustness. We exploit the homomorphism characteristics of Reed-Solomon
code to update the error correction codes in the authentication code embedding process.
Thus, the embedding process does not reduce the error correction capacity. The generated
stego QR code maintains a strong robustness against different types of attacks.
3) Lower power consumption. The proposed scheme encodes the authentication code into
Sudoku matrix digits. Compared to authentication code encrypted by the symmetric
encryption algorithm or asymmetric encryption algorithm in Chen’s scheme, the authen-
tication code embedding process and extraction process of the proposed scheme is
dramatically simple and has the benefit of lower power consumption. Moreover, the
diversity of Sudoku magic matrix guarantees that the proposed scheme achieves a high
security level.
The rest of this paper is presented as follows. We briefly introduced the technology of QR code
and Sudoku, especially the QR code generating process in Section 2. In Section 3, we
presented the construction of Sudoku expansion matrix and the homomorphism of Reed-
Solomon code, then presented the authentication QR code enrollment process and the verifi-
cation process of the proposed scheme. In Section 4, we provided the simulated results of the
proposed scheme, and conducted comparisons with previous schemes. Finally, we made a
conclusion in Section 5.
2 Background
In this section, we briefly introduce the technology of QR code and Sudoku.
2.1 The technology of QR code
Quick Response (QR) code is a kind of two dimension code, which is invented by a
Japanese company Denso-Wave [7] in 1994. QR code has a much higher message
capacity than the traditional barcode, and it has been a public patent since the
corresponding ISO international standard ISO/IEC18004 was approved in 2000 [8].
With the development of Internet of Things (IoT) and the popularity of smartphones
in recent years, QR code becames the most popular two dimensional code in the
world, especially in the Southeast Asia.
QR code consists of numerous black and white squares, these squares are called modules.
There are forty QR code versions and four user-selectable error correction levels for each
version to encapsulate a QR code message. In addition to the data codewords, each QR code
also contains error correction codewords and functional patterns such as position detection
patterns, timing patterns, version patterns, format information and alignment patterns. Figure 2
shows the structure of QR code in version 2 with error correction level M. The QR code
generation process is described as follows.
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Step 1) According to the QR code version and its error correction level, the QR code data
codewords m is divided into n blocks.
m ¼ m1;m2; :::;mnf g: ð1Þ
Step 2) QR code exploits the Reed-Solomon (RS) code [22] to detect and correct the
errors that occurred during QR code decoding when portion of QR code was damaged.
Error correction codewords will be generated for each data block mi, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and
appended to the corresponding data codewords.
ei ¼ E mið Þ; 1≤ i≤n; ð2Þ
where E ð Þ is RS code calculation function. Then n blocks RS codes are derived.
RS ¼ rs1; rs2;⋯; rsnf g ¼ m1; e1ð Þ; m2; e2ð Þ;⋯; mn; enð Þf g; 1≤ i≤n: ð3Þ
Step 3) These RS codes will be fitted into a final data sequence D by taking data
codewords and error correction codewords for each RS code block in turn.
D ¼ F RSð Þ; ð4Þ
where F ð Þ is QR code data fitting function.
Fig. 2 The structure of QR code in version 2-M
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Step 4) This data sequence D will be placed from the lower right corner of the QR code
symbol in zigzag order, then masked with one of eight predefined patterns through XOR
operation to generate a final QR code tag QR.
QR ¼ M Dð Þ; ð5Þ
where M ð Þ is the QR code masking function.
2.2 Sudoku magic matrix
Sudoku is a popular logic-based number padding game. The classic Sudoku plate is a 9 × 9
block. It contains nine 3 × 3 sub-blocks. Players need to deduce the numbers on all the
remaining empty squares according to the visible numbers on the 9 × 9 Sudoku plate, so that
each row, each column and each sub-block (3 × 3) contains all the digits from 1 to 9. Figure 3
shows one of the Sudoku puzzle and its solution.
Sudoku originated in Latin Square, and was developed in the United States in the 1970s. It
was renamed as Number Placement and spread to Japan. The Japanese game company Nikoli
developed it as a math puzzle game called it Sudoku in 1986. Since 2005, Sudoku puzzle game
has become popular in the whole world.
In September 2003, Felgenhauer and Jarvis [6] calculated that there are
6,670,903,752,021,072,936,960 ≈ 6.7 × 1020 possible Sudoku solutions. Therefore, the proba-
bility of cracking a Sudoku-based encryption scheme by brute-force manner is extremely low.
This fact benefits our proposed QR code encryption algorithm and makes it very robust with
high security intrinsically.
Fig. 3 An example of Sudoku. a A typical Sudoku puzzle. b The solution of (a)
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3 The proposed scheme
In this section, we describe the proposed algorithm for QR code authentication based on
the Sudoku magic matrix and the homomorphism of RS code. we firstly will introduce
the construction of the Sudoku expansion matrix, then discuss the homomorphism of
Reed-Solomon code, and finally, present the authentication QR code enrollment process
and the verification process of the proposed scheme.
3.1 Sudoku expansion matrix
It is not good to directly fill the authentication code with the form of plaintext into
the QR code padding region since it is vulnerable to the attacks from the malicious
users. With the nature of the extremely high variety of Sudoku, we can design an
encryption algorithm which is simple to encode but extremely hard to be cracked. The
proposed scheme exploits Sudoku matrix to hide the authentication code into QR code
padding region in the form of Sudoku digit. In order to hide the authentication code
with higher level of security within the QR code, we propose a modified version of
Sudoku matrix, which is described as follows.
Firstly, we choose a Sudoku puzzle, and determine a Sudoku matrix using the digits
from 1 to 9. Then subtract 1 from all the digits in the Sudoku block. Figure 4a
demonstrates an example of such modified version of Sudoku matrix in Fig. 3b. Finally,
a Sudoku Expansion Matrix (SEM) with the size of 16 × 16 is derived by repeating the
Fig. 4 Two examples of the modified Sudoku matrices. a An example of the modified Sudoku matrix. b An
example of 16 × 16 matrix SEM derived from (a)
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pattern of the 9 × 9 matrix until the size 16 × 16 is fulfilled. Figure 4b shows the
corresponding SEM derived from Fig. 4a.
In the proposed scheme, the SEM will be shared among users as a kind of encryption
key. In order to minimize the storage space of SEM, neither the 9 × 9 matrix nor the 16 ×
16 matrix is shared to the users. Instead, the original Sudoku puzzle (an example is shown
in Fig. 3a) is shared in a compressed fashion using Huffman encoding [10] or Run-length
encoding [19].
3.2 The homomorphism of RS code
According to the QR code specification, it employs RS code to detect and correct noise
induced errors without loss of data. For RS codes consist of a bits data message and b bits error
correction code, it can correct up to b=82
j k
codewords data errors. Figure 5 shows the
composition of RS code in the QR code. The a bits data codewords of RS code in QR code
always contain two parts: c bits public message and (a − c) bits padding message. Note that
these (a − c) bits padding message are meaningless and useless, so it is possible to modify
these padding bits to embed the authentication code in the padding region of QR code.
In 2012, Russ Cox [5] found out that two different RS codes with the same parameters a
and b could be XORed to generate another valid RS code. Such nature can be called the
homomorphism of RS code. In this way, we can easily derive a new RS code from the other
two valid RS codes.
Based on the homomorphism of RS code, we can modify any bit of padding bits of
RS code in QR code and keep the other bits unchanged. Table 1 shows an example.
The first row of Table 1 shows a RS code RS0 that satisfies the conditions a = 16, b =
16 and c = 8. Suppose we want to invert the 10th bit and 12th bit of the RS0. We can
construct a 16-bit data codewords 0000000001010000 whose data bits are all zeros
except the 10th bit and 12th bit, use Reed-Solomon algorithm to generate the 16-bit
error correction codewords 1,111,000,010,100,000 and add them to the tail of data
codewords to form a temp RS code RS1. Finally, we can derive a result RS2 by
XORing RS0 with RS1. The XOR operation inverts the 10th bit and 12th bit of RS0.
Most importantly, the result RS2 still is a valid RS code.
This XORing operation does not consume the QR code error correction capacity. It updates
the error correction codewords of QR code to maintain its validity. Meanwhile, the pubic
message of QR code still can be decoded by any standard QR code reader. Therefore, the stego
QR code appears as if it is a normal QR code for general users. Such characteristics will reduce
people’s curiosity.
Fig. 5 The composition of RS code in the QR code
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3.3 The authentication code embedding procedure
The procedure of authentication code embedding is shown in Algorithm 1. Suppose we want to
generate a QR code QRau with authentication code s. TheQRau public message is pwith a length
of c, and the authentication code s is the hash value of p. The QR code enrollment process of the
proposed scheme is demonstrated in Fig. 6. The authentication code swill be hided in the padding
region of QR code in the form of the coordinates in Sudoku expansion matrix SEM. After
confirming the bit location that need to be flipped in the padding region, the procedure will
generate a newRS code and XOR it with the original RS code to embed the authentication code s.
The XOR operation will update the QR code error correction code according to the RS code
homomorphism. Finally, A stego QR code with authentication code s is derived.
Step 1) Randomly choose a Sudoku puzzle as an embedding key k, then construct the
Sudoku expansion matrix SEM with size of 16 × 16.
SEM ¼ S k; 16ð Þ; ð6Þ
where S ð Þ is the Sudoku expansion matrix construction function.
Step 2) Choose a suitable QR code version v and error correction level l according to the
length of public message p and authentication code s, then employ Reed-Solomon algorithm
to yield the corresponding Reed-Solomon code RSori. Finally, we can obtain the length of
data codewords a and the length of error correction codewords b of RS code RSori.
Table 1 An example of homomorphism of RS code
RS0 11000001000101000100000110010100
RS1 00000000010100001111000010100000
RS2 11000001010001001011000100110100
Fig. 6 The QR code enrollment process of the proposed scheme
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ℝS p; v; lð Þ ¼ a; b;RSorif g; ð7Þ
where ℝS ð Þ is the RS code generation function.
Step 3)Generate the hash value of public message p as the authentication code s by using
general hash function such as MD5, SHA-1, SHA-3, SHA-256, and so on, then convert
the authentication code s into novenary digits stream {s1, s2,⋯, sn}, which is a 9-ary
numerical system to match the digits in SEM.
ℂ ℍ pð Þð Þ
¼ ℂ sð Þ
¼ s1; s2;⋯; snf g;
ð8Þ
where ℂ(·) is novenary digit conversion function while ℍ(·) is the general hash function.
Step 4) Sequentially group eight binary digits from padding region as a hexadecimal data
pair (x, y), sequentially pick up an authentication code si. Then find (x′, y′) which is the
closest from (x, y) to learn the secret digit by mapping the row x′ and the column y′ in the
Sudoku expansion matrix SEM. Finally, replace the data pair (x, y) with new data pair (x′,
y′) to hide the authentication code digits si.
L x; y; sið Þ ¼ x0 ; y0
n o
; ð9Þ
where x, y, x′, y′ ∈ [0, F], and L ð Þ is the looking up Sudoku expansion matrix function for the
pair (x′, y′) near (x, y) to the matrix SEM to satisfy the condition si = SEM(x′, y′). For instance,
suppose that one of the authentication code digit is 1, and 01101010 is the eight bits of padding
region message to be embedded. Thus, the corresponding hexadecimal data pair is (6, A).
According to the matrix SEM in Fig. 4b, the value stored at the SEM(6,A) is 2. Using this cell
as the center to search for the closest cell that has a value of 1, we can find three cells: 1 =
SEM(4, 9) = SEM(5, 8) = SEM(7, B). Among them, it is obvious to see that (7, B) is the nearest
cell from(6,A). And we shall use the value pair (7, B) to be the new data pair (x′, y′).
Step 5) Employ the XOR function to yield an eight-bits binary string di by XORing (x, y)
with (x′, y′). This binary bit string di indicates the changed bits of QR code padding
message bits while hiding a novenary authentication code digit si in Step 4.
di ¼ X x; yð Þ; x0 ; y0
  
; 1≤ i≤n; ð10Þ
where X ð Þ is XOR operation function. Take the example mentioned earlier,
di ¼ X 6;Að Þ; 7;Bð Þð Þ ¼ X 0110; 1010ð Þ; 0111; 1011ð Þð Þ ¼ 00010001.
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Step 6) Repeat Step 4 and Step 5 until all the stream of authentication code digits {s1, s2,
⋯, sn} find the corresponding new data pair (x′, y′). Then derive a sequence of di to form a
binary data stream d of length 8n. The bit stream d marks the changes of padding region
of original QR code while embedding all the authentication code s.
d ¼ d1; d2;⋯; dnf g: ð11Þ
Step 7) Note that the a bits data codewords of RS code in QR code always contain c bits
public message and (a − c) bits padding message. Therefore we add c bits ‘0’ in the front
of bit stream d and (a − c − 8n) bits ‘0’ in the tail of bit stream d to yield a a bits data
codewords dc.
dc ¼ ℙ dð Þ; ð12Þ
where ℙ(·) is the padding function. Figure 7 shows the composition of dc.
Step 8) Use Reed-Solomon algorithm to generate the corresponding error correction
codewords ec. Then add it to the tail of dc to construct a new RS code RSn.
RSn ¼ dc; ecf g ¼ dc;E dcð Þf g: ð13Þ
Step 9) XOR the RS code RSori with the new RS code RSn to yield a final RS code RSf.
According to the homomorphism of RS code described in Section 3.2, the XOR operation
will modify the padding region of QR code to hide the authentication code s and keep the
public message of original QR code unchanged. Most importantly, the error correction
codewords will be updated, thus the embedding process does not reduce the error
correction capacity of QR code.
RS f ¼ X RS;RSnð Þ: ð14Þ
Step 10) The codewords in the final RS code will be placed in a matrix, and a masking
process will be executed to distribute black and white modules evenly. Finally, a QR code
QRau with authentication code s will be generated.
QRau ¼ M F RS f
  
: ð15Þ
Fig. 7 The composition of dc which is padded from d
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Algorithm 1 Authentication code embedding
Input:  The QR code public message p , its length c . Sudoku puzzle.
Output: The stego QR code auQR with authentication code. 
0 begin
1 Construct Sudoku expansion matrix SEM .
2 Generate the RS code oriRS according to the public messge p .
3 ( )s p .
4 Convert s into a 9-ary digits stream 1 2, , , ns s s .
5 for each 1 2, , ,i ns s s s do
6 Group eight bits in padding region as coordinate ,x y .
7 Find the ,x y in SEM satisfying the condition ,is SEM x y .
8 Calculate , ,id x y XOR x y
9 end for
10 1 2, , , nd d d d .
11 Pad c bits ‘0’ in the front of d .
12 Construct a new RS code nRS .
13 Yield a final RS code f n oriRS RS XOR RS
14 Generate the stego QR code auQR with authentication code s based on fRS
15 end begin
3.4 The tamper detection procedure
The procedure of tamper detection is shown in Algorithm 2. Suppose there is an authentication QR
code QR
0
au that will be validated, and the inspector keeps an authentication code embedding key k,
which is the Sudoku puzzle. Figure 8 illustrated the verification process of the proposed scheme. The
authentication code s′will be extracted from the padding region by looking up the SEMmatrix.QR
0
au
is authentic only when s′ equals to the hash value of public message of stego QR code QR
0
au.
Step 1) Use the embedding key k to construct the Sudoku expansion matrix SEM as
described in Step 1 of Section 3.3.
Step 2) Unmask the authentication QR code QR
0
au, then extract the public message p′ and
the RS code RS′ of QR
0
au.
ℝ M QR0au
  
¼ p0 ;RS 0
n o
; ð16Þ
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where M ð Þ is the QR code unmasking function, and ℝ(·) is the QR code decoding function.
Step 3) Sequentially group eight bits from padding region ofRS′ as a hexadecimal data pair (x,
y), and extract all the authentication code digit si′ bymapping the row x and the column y in the
Sudoku expansion matrix SEM. Finally, derive a complete authentication code s′.
s
0 ¼ T RS 0 ; SEM
 
; ð17Þ
where T ð Þ is the authentication code extraction function.
Step 4) verify the QR codeQR
0
au to derive the result r by comparing s′ with the hash value
of QR code public message p′. r = 1 if they are the same. It means QR code QR
0
au is
authentic; otherwise, the QR code QR
0
au is considered as tempered.
r ¼ V s0 ;ℍ p0
  
; ð18Þ
where V ð Þ is the QR code verification function.
Algorithm 2 Tamper detection
Input:  The stego QR code auQR .  Sudoku puzzle.
Output:  Result r .
0 begin
1 Construct Sudoku expansion matrix SEM .
2 Extract the public messge p and RS code RS of auQR .
3 ( )s p .
4 While true do
5 Group eight bits in padding region as coordinate ,x y .
6 Extract the authentication code ,is SEM x y .
7 if it is end of the padding region, then
8 break
9 end if
10 end while
11 Convert the 9-ary digits stream 1 2, , , ns s s into binary s.
12 if s s then
13 1r
14 else 0r
15 end if
16 end begin
Multimedia Tools and Applications (2019) 78:26023–26045 26035
4 Simulation results and discussion
In this section, we present the performance of the proposed QR code authentication scheme,
then discuss the advantages compared to the previous methods.
4.1 Experimental results
To evaluate the practicality of the proposed QR code authentication scheme, a piece of software is
developed by using python programming language. In our implementation, the Sudoku puzzle of
Fig. 3a is selected to be the authentication code embedding key k, and SHA-1 is selected to be the
hash function to yield the authentication code by hashing the QR code public messages. Here we
show a QR code authentication example. Figure 9a shows an original QR code of version 5 with
default error correction level ‘L’. The public message of the QR code p is Bwww.fcu.edu.tw .̂ The
corresponding authentication code s is B061e4cdb0cd3fa97aded9aff72e9409850aa0048^ which
is generated from the SHA-1 hash function. According to the QR code standard, the QR code of
version 5-L contains 108 data codewords and 26 error correction codewords, so we could infer
that a = 108 × 8 = 864 and b = 26 × 8 = 208. After adding the supplementary information, the
public message p would be encoded to be c = 124 bits binary message stream. With the help of
Sudoku expansion matrix SEM and homomorphism of Reed-Solomon code, the authentication
code s would be converted in novenary digits stream, then embedded into the 124th bit of QR
code data message codewords, which is located in the padding region of QR code. Figure 9b
shows the authentication result of Fig. 9a. The embedding process would update the error
correction code of QR code. Therefore, it did not consume any error correction capacity of QR
Fig. 8 The QR code verification process of the proposed scheme
Fig. 9 An example the proposed scheme; a Aversion 5-L original QR code with public message Bwww.fcu.edu.
tw^; b the corresponding stego QR code of (a)
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code, and the generated QR code remains to have high robustness. Moreover, the public message
of QR code is not altered by the embedding process. It still could be fully decoded by any standard
QR code reader. However, the authentication code only can be extracted by the authorized person
with a correct embedding key k.
4.2 The embedding capacity of the proposed scheme
According to the authentication code embedding process in the Section 3.3, the authentication
code s would be converted into 9-ary digital steam, then embedded in the padding region of
QR code with the help of Sudoku expansion matrix. Thus, the embedding capacity of the
proposed scheme depends on the length (a − c) of the padding region of QR code. Moreover,
the length of the padding region depends not only on the version v and error correction level l
of QR code, but also on the length of public message c of the QR code. For a certain v and l of
QR code, the embedding capacity would reach the maximal value only if the length of public
message c = 0. Note that eight bits padding message would be embedded a 9-ary authentica-
tion code si. It means that a codeword QR code data message could hide a number of log29 bits
authentication code on average. So the embedding capacity ec = ⌊log29 × a⌋, here a is the
length of data codewords of the cover QR code. Take version 1-L QR code for example, it has
19 data codewords, so the corresponding embedding capacity ec = ⌊log29 × 19⌋ = 60. Table 2
shows the maximal embedding capacity of QR code of the proposed scheme for different
versions and error correction levels of QR code under the conditions of the length of QR code
public message c = 0. From the following table we can learn the embedding capacity of the
proposed scheme is adjustable within the range of [28, 9370].
4.3 The robustness of the proposed scheme
In the QR code application scenario, very often the QR codes are scanned by different users
with different cameras under different lighting conditions. The image quality of captured QR
code depends not only on the sensitivity of camera sensors but also on environmental
illumination. When there is no sufficient illumination, the image noises become higher. These
noises are considered as an attack and they seriously degrade the quality of QR code digital
image. Under such attack, the success rate for the QR code decoding will decrease. The first
row of Fig. 10 shows the attack results of the stego QR code in Fig. 9b suffered serious noise
attack in Matlab, such as Gaussian noise with parameter M = 0 and V = 0.15, salt and pepper
noise with parameter d = 0.10, speckle noise with parameter v = 0.10, respectively.
Table 2 The embedding capacity of the proposed scheme
Versions The embedding capacity of the proposed scheme(bits)
Levels 1 10 20 30 40
L 60 868 2729 5499 9370
M 50 684 2120 4352 7398
Q 41 488 1537 3122 5281
H 28 386 1220 2361 4044
Multimedia Tools and Applications (2019) 78:26023–26045 26037
In practical application, QR code would be printed on some kinds of paper media.
These printed QR code might be defaced even damaged. These factors could be
considered another kind of attacks which also reduce the success rate of the QR code
decoding. We use the image editing tools to paint and erase the stego QR code to
simulate the fouling attack. The second row of Fig. 10 shows the attack results of
stego QR code in Fig. 9b defaced by one line, one circle and one star, respectively.
The last row of Fig. 10 shows the attack results of stego QR code in in Fig. 9b
damaged with different area size.
The term BReadable^ represents QR code public message can be read by any QR code
standard scanner. The term BDecodable^ represents the authentication message in the stego
QR code can be successfully decoded by a custom QR code scanner that supports the proposed
scheme. The attack results show that the public message of stego QR code still can be decoded
correctly despite a serious attack. Moreover, the authentication code embedded in the stego QR
code can also be successfully extracted. It demonstrates that the proposed QR code authenti-
cation scheme is robust to different types of attacks.
Noising settings:
Gaussian noise
(M=0, V=0.15)
Salt & pepper noise
(d=0.10)
Speckle noise
(v=0.10)
Attack results:
Public message:
Authentication code:
Readable
Decodable
Readable
Decodable
Readable
Decodable
QR code defacement: One line One circle One star
Attack results:
Public message:
Authentication code:
Readable
Decodable 
Readable
Decodable
Readable
Decodable
QR code damage :
A square with 6% area 
size
Two squares with 3% 
area size
One square with 3% 
area size, the other 4%
Attack results:
Public message:
Authentication code:
Readable
Decodable
Readable
Decodable
Readable
Decodable
Fig. 10 The results of different types of attacks on the stego QR code of the proposed scheme
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4.4 The security of the proposed scheme
The proposed scheme embeds the authentication code in the QR code padding region
with the help of SEM. The authentication code embedding process and decoding process
is very simple and easy to implement. Obviously, if a malicious user got the embedding
key k(the Sudoku puzzle), he/she would be able to reconstruct the SEM, then easily
extract the authentication code from the padding region of stego QR code. Therefore, the
Fig. 11 An example of the QR code authentication patterns from Chen’s scheme [2]. a the original QR code with
version 5-L; b the corresponding stego QR code of (a) with version 6-M
QR code 
damage:
A square of 6% area size
Two squares of 3% area 
size
One square of 3% area 
size, and the other 4%
Attack 
results:
Valid Invalid Invalid
QR code 
defacement
One line One circle One star
Attack 
results:
Invalid Invalid Valid
Fig. 12 The robustness of Chen’s scheme
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Sudoku is the key to the security of the proposed QR code authentication scheme.
Fortunately, as mentioned in Section 2.2, the number of possible solutions to a classical
Sudoku is 6,670,903,752,021,072,936,960 ≈ 6.7 × 1020. The probability of a random
guess to get the correct key is 1/6.7 × 1020 ≈ 0.149 × 10−20, which indicates that our
proposed scheme is very hard to crack. Therefore, the proposed QR code authentication
scheme is highly secure.
4.5 Comparison and discussion
In the literature, Chen’s scheme [2] employed the symmetric and asymmetric encryp-
tion algorithm to generate the authentication code, then embeded these authentication
code in the front portion of error correction codewords of the original QR code by
replacing those error correction codewords with the authentication code directly. How-
ever, such operation would lead to the loss of data codewords in the RS code of QR
code and it requires to exploit the error correction capability of the error correct
codeword to fix it. In other words, it consumes the error correct codeword of the
original QR code and makes it less robust. In order to overcome this defect, Chen’s
scheme had to generate a higher version of stego QR code than the original QR code
requires. Figure 11a shows an example of the original QR code with version 5-L
following Chen’s scheme. To enhance the robustness of stego QR code, in Chen’s
scheme, they need to upgrade the version of the QR code to 6-M. Figure 11b shows the
result of the corresponding stego QR code. Compared Fig. 11b with Fig. 11a, the
upgraded stego QR code has a smaller module size. In consequence, it is highly likely
to decrease the successful decoding rate of stego QR code. This problem becomes more
serious especially when the QR code version is larger than 20 [25]. However, with the
help of homomorphism of Reed-Solomon code, the proposed scheme embeds the
authentication code in the padding region of original QR code without sacrificing the
error correction capability. Thus, as shown in Fig. 9, the version of generated stego QR
code is the same to the original QR code in the proposed scheme.
Table 3 The embedding capacity compared Chen’s scheme with the proposed scheme
QR code versions Error correction
levels
Chen’s scheme (bits) The proposed
scheme(bits)
1 L(7%) 0 60
M(15%) 0 50
Q(25%) 0 41
H(30%) 0 28
2 L(7%) 0 107
M(15%) 32 88
Q(25%) 56 69
H(30%) 80 50
40 L(7%) 0 9370
M(15%) 2488 7398
Q(25%) 5160 5281
H(30%) 6720 4044
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As mentioned above, the authentication code embedding strategy of Chen’s scheme
would lead to the consumption of the error correction capacity of QR code, and in turn,
reduce the robustness of the generated stego QR code. Figure 12 shows the decoding
results of stego QR code of Chen’s scheme after suffering defacement or even partly
damaged. The decoding results show that some of the stego QR codes of Chen’s scheme
became unable to read. However, as shown in Fig. 10, the public message and the
authentication code of the stego QR codes of the proposed scheme still can be decoded
and extracted after suffering similar attacks. It demonstrated that the robustness of the
proposed scheme is much higher than Chen’s scheme.
In terms of authentication code embedding capacity, Chen’s scheme utilized the
redundancy of error correction codewords to embed the authentication code. Therefore,
the secret message embedding capacity depends on the error correction capacity of
stego QR code. According to the embedding strategy of Chen’s scheme, the version
and error correction level of the stego QR code would be 1 higher than the original
QR code to maintain the default error correction capacity which can correct 7% of
error data codewords in QR code. It is easily inferred that version 2-M is the smallest
version that could be used as stego QR code. According to the QR code specification,
the error correction capacity of version 2-M QR code is 8 codewords while the error
correction capacity of version 2-L QR code is 4 codewords. So the version 2-M stego
QR code only has 4 (8–4 = 4) codewords error correction codewords to correct the
errors resulted from the embedding process, which is 32 (4 × 8 = 32) bits length of
authentication code. And the version 40-H is the biggest version of stego QR code
candidate which could embed 6720 bits of authentication code. In summary, the
embedding capacity of Chen’s scheme is in the range of [32, 6720]. However, the
embedding capacity of the proposed scheme is limited by the length of the padding
region of original QR code. Table 3 shows the embedding capacity comparison
between Chen’s scheme and the proposed scheme. It demonstrates that the proposed
scheme has a higher embedding capacity than Chen’s scheme for almost every QR
code version.
In terms of security, Chen’s scheme exploits the symmetric or asymmetric encryption
algorithm such as ECDSA to protect the authentication message. It able to achieve high level
security. In the proposed scheme, Sudoku is the key to the security of the proposed QR code
authentication scheme. As mentioned in Section 2.2, the classical Sudoku has nearly 6.7 × 1020
possible solutions. The probability of one guessing is 1/6.7 × 1020 ≈ 0.149 × 10−20, this is
Table 4 The comparison of Chen’s scheme and the proposed scheme
Schemes Chen’s scheme The proposed scheme
The way of authentication
code generation
Symmetric or asymmetric
encryption algorithm
Hash function
Security High High
Robustness Poor Strong
Power consumption Mid Low
Embedding capacity Adjustable
[0, 6720]
Adjustable
[28, 9370]
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almost impossible to crack when using Sudoku to encrypt the authentication code in the
proposed scheme. So both the proposed QR code authentication scheme and Chen’s scheme
are highly secure.
In terms of power consumption, compared to the symmetric or asymmetric encryption
algorithm hired in Chen’s scheme, the run time of the proposed authentication code generation
method is much shorter than that of Chen’s scheme. We implemented both Chen’s scheme and
the proposed scheme in python programming language, and tested the speed of the authenti-
cation extraction procedure in a personal computer respectively. This computer has an Intel
Core i5-6200 U CPU and 8GB RAM, and runs with Win 10 operation system. The run time of
the embedding procedure and tamper detection procedure of Chen’ scheme are 0.727 s and
0.858 s respectively, and the corresponding run time of the proposed scheme are 0.173 s and
0.115 s respectively. It means that the proposed scheme does not require much computational
power, and is able to achieve the high level security at the same time. It is more suitable for
battery powered QR scanner.
Table 4 shows an overall comparison between Chen’s scheme and the proposed scheme. As
can be seen from the table, the proposed scheme achieves higher robustness, lower power
consumption and higher embedding capacity than Chen’s method.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, by exploiting the security and reversibility characteristics of Sudoku magic
matrix and the homomorphism characteristic of Reed-Solomon code, we propose a new robust
QR code authentication mechanism with authentication capacity enhancement to empower the
QR code with the ability of secret message embedding and authentication. Experimental
results show that the proposed scheme is simpler, more efficient, and less computational
intensive compared to the existing algorithm. It can be used for QR code anti-counterfeiting.
In the future, we will try to investigate other data hiding technique in order to increase the
embedding capacity and further enhance the robustness for resisting various kinds of attacks.
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